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Estate of GEORGE OWEN KNAPP, Deceased. FRED-
ERIC~ A. GODLEY, as Executor, etc., Appellant, v. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Taxation - Inheritance Taxation - Valuation.- When a will 
creates a life estate and remainder interests in the same 
property, it is necessary to divide the value of the property 
at the date of decedent's death between the life interests and 
the remainders for purposes of inheritance taxation, and the 
value of the remainders is determined by deducting the value 
of the life interest from the total value of the property. 
(Cal. Adm. Code, tit. 18, § 793.) 
[2] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-Where a will creates 
a life estate and remainder interests, the valuation of the 
life estate serves as a measure of the tax on its own transfer 
and also as the means of determining the value of the re-
mainder interests. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955, which provides 
for valuation based on the actual duration of the life tenant's 
life when he dies before determination of the tllX, is not 
[1] Time as of which value is computed for inheritance tax, 
note, 160 A.L.R. 1059. See, also, 24 Cal.Jur. 463; 28 Am.Jur. 117. 
J4cK. Dig. References; [1,3] Taxation, § 441(2); [2,4-li.l Taxa-
tion, § 441(1); [10] Tuatioll, § 438. 
\ 
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limited to determining the tax on the transfer of the life 
interest, and it calls for a more accurate apportionment of 
the taxes between the transfers of the life interest and the 
remainders than does : 13953, which provides for valuation 
based on the life t~llant's life expectancy as of the date of . 
decedent's death. ' 
[8] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-For inheritance tax 
purposes, the value of a life interest is the value of that 
interest as of the date of decedent's death, whether it is 
determined under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13953 or § 13955. 
[4] Id.-Inheritance Ta:.:ation-Valuation.-The value of an aD-
nuity or estate under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955, is found by I 
discounting back to the date of decedent's death the pay-
ments paid or payable to the annuitant or life tenant while 
he lived. 
[6] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-When it is not known ~ 
at date of decedent's death how long an annuitant or life 
tenant will live, it is necessary to resort to mortality tables to 
determine the probable duration of his life j·'1lut when the 
annuitant or life tenant dies before a tax of his interest is I 
fixed, an annuity or estate for life has become an annuity or 
estate for years, and continued use of mortality tables would 
nullify the requirement of accuracy in valuation prescribed 
by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955. 
[6] Id. - Inheritance Taxatiol - Valuation. - Under the express 
language of Inheritance Tax Act of 1935, § 8, subsec. 8 (Stats. 
1935, p. 1279) as it then read, the valuation of a life estate 
on the basis of its actual duration was made, not solely for 
the purpose of taxing the transfer of that interest, but for 
the purpose of taxation generally under the act j and under 
the codification of that subsection in Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955, 
there is no indication that the value of the life interest as 
determined under that section is not the value it should be 
assigned for all purposes of inheritance taxation. 
[7] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-The objective of Rev. 
& Tax. Code, § 13952, that in the case of transfers of estates 
determinable on contingency the entire property is to be 
valued as of the date of decedent's death, may be achieved 
by the consistent application of § 13953 to determine the value 
of both the life interest and remainder interests, or by the 
consistent application of § 13955 to determine the value of 
the life interest and the remainder interests, if the life tenant 
dies before the tax has been determined. 
[8] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13952, will be violated if § 13955 is applied only for the 
purpose of computing an inheritance tax on a life interest and 
§ 13953 is applied to determine the value of the life interest 
) 
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for the purpose of evaluating the remainder, since in such 
case the entire property by which the respective interests IIr~ 
supported will not be. valued as of thc date of deeedtmt's 
death, but part of the entire property will eseape valuation 
altogether. 
[9] Id.-Inheritance Taxation-Valuation.-R.ev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13955, which provides an alternative method of evaluating 
a life interest when the life tenant dies before determination 
of an inheritance tax, must be used for all purposes or for 
none, since in the contingency therein provided the valuation 
of the life interest is removed from the operation of § 13953, 
and the value of the remainder must be determined by sub-
tracting the value of the life interest as determined under 
§ 13955 from the present value of the entire property as of 
the date of decedent's death. 
[10] Id. - Inheritance Taxation - Rates. - Where testator be-
queathed an annuity from testamentary trusts to his son for 
life and an annuity from the same trusts to his son's wife after 
death of her husband, if she were then living, and the son died 
before the inheritance tax had been determined, it was proper 
under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13411, relating to computation at the 
highest rate on transfers subject to contingency or condition, to 
fix the tax on the transfer of the wife's remainder interest, 
since the rate with respect to her interest was higher than that 
w~th respect to the interest of certain named grandchildren to 
whom the remainders were to go in case of her death. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Santa 
Barbara County fixing amount of inheritance tax. Ernest 
D. Wagner, Judge. Affirmed. 
Heaney, Price, Postel & Parma for Appellant. 
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, Morton 
L. Baker and Raymond G. LaNoue, Deputy Inheritance 
Tax Attorneys, and Bert G. Wetherby, Assistant Inheritance 
Tax Attorney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The testator, George Owen Knapp, be-
queathed to his son William Jared Knapp an annuity of 
$10,000 per year from each of five testamentary trusts, a total 
of $50,000 per year for life. Upon William's death his wife 
Louise Allen Knapp, if then living, was to receive an annuity 
of $15,000 per year from eacll of the five trusts, a total of 
$75,000 per year for life. Upon Louise's death, or upon Wil-
liam's death if Louise was not then living, thE' remainders 
were to go to certain named grandchildren of the testator. 
830 ESTATE OF KNAPP [3'7 C.2d 
In the first report tiled by the state inheritance tax appraiser 
William's interest was appraised pursuant to section 139531 
of the Revenue and Taxation Code, and the value of that 
interest was deducted from the value of the entire property 
involved at the date of the testator's death to determine the 
value of the remainders. Before any action was taken by the 
court on the report, William died leaving his wife Louise 
surviving. The inheritance tax appraiser filed a second report 
pursuant to section 139552 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, 
and the value of William's interest as determined under that 
section was deducted from the entire value of the property 
involved to determine the value of the remainders. In the 
first report William's interest was valued at $463,161.35 and 
the tax with respect thereto computed at $33,834.52. Louise's 
interest was valued at $96,346.65 and the tax with respect 
thereto computed at $7,534.67. In the second report William's 
interest was reappraised at $99,726.03 and the tax with respect 
thereto computed at $3,139.04, Louise's interest .)Vas re-
appraised at $546,032.04 and the tax with respect thereto 
recomputed at $66,804.81. 
The executor filed objections to the second report. Upon 
the hearing it was stipulated that (a) at the death of William 
the tax on his life interest had not been determined; and 
(b) the only point in dispute related to the correctness of 
the tax charged against Louise. The court overruled the 
objections and entered its order fixing the inheritance tax 
in accord with the inheritance tax appraiser's second report. 
Prom that order the executor appeals. 
[1] When, as in the present case, a will creates a life 
interest and remainder interests in the same property, it is 
necessary to divide the value of the property at the date of 
1"The value of a future, contingent, or limited estate, income, or 
interest is determined in accordance with the rules, methods, and 
standards of mortality and value that are set forth in the actuaries' 
combined experience tables of mortality, as extended, for ascertaining 
the values of life insurance policies and annuities and for determining 
the liabilities of life insurance companies, save that the rate of interest 
used ill computing the present value of the estate, income, or interest 
is four (4) per cent per annum." (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 13[)!"3.) 
·"If an annuity or a life estate is terminated by the death of the 
annuitant or life tenant or by the happening of a. contingency, and 
the tax upon the transfer of the annuity or estate has not been deter-
mined, the value of the annuity or estate is the present value, at the 
date of the transferor's death, of the amount of the annuity or income 
actually paid or payable to the annuitant or life tenant during the 
period he was entitled to the annuity or was in possession of the 
estate." (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 13955.) 
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the decedent's death between the life interest and the re-
mainders for t1le purposes of inheritance taxation. This divi-
sion is generally made by deducting the value of the life interest 
from the total value of' the property. The difference repre-
sents the value of the remainders. (Cal. Adm. Code, tit. 18, 
§ 793.) "It is the settled law of this state that the inheritance 
tax is imposed upon the net clear value of what the transferee 
receives, and that to ascertain this the value of what he does 
not receive, in contemplation of law, must be deducted from 
the value of what the decedent left." (Estate of Miller, 184 
Cal. 674, 682 [195 P. 413, 16 A.L.R. 694] ; see 28 Am.Jur., 
Inheritance, Estate and Gift Taxes, § 232, p. 117; 47 Yale L. J. 
1354, 1357.) 
Under the foregoing rule the valuation of the life interest 
serves two purposes. It serves as a measure of the tax on its 
own transfer and also as the means of determining the value 
of the remainder interests. The Revenue and Taxation 
Code provides two alternative methods for determining its 
value, one based on the life tenant's life expectancy as of the 
date of the decedent's death (§ 13953), and the other based 
on the actual duration of his life when he dies before the 
determination of the tax. (§ 13955.) Reasonable symmetry 
suggests that whatever method is used to determine the value 
of the life interest for one purpose should also be used for 
the other. [2] By requiring the substitution of fact for prob-
abilities, section 13955 calls for a more accurate apportionment 
of the taxes between the transfers of the life interest and the 
remainders than section 13953. Section 13955 cannot reason-
ably be construed as limited to the purpose of determining 
the tax on the transfer of the life interest alone. 
Appellant agrees that since William died before the deter-
mination of the tax, his interest must be valued under section 
13955. He agrees also that the value of the remainder inter-
ests is determined by deducting the value of the life interest 
from the value of the entire property. He contends, however, 
that in determining the value of the remainder interests, the 
value of William's interest must be determined under section 
13953 by reference to William's life expectancy as of the date 
of decedent's death. This contention is based on the theory 
that, with the exception of a life interest valued under section 
13955, the statutes require that all interests be valued as of 
the date of the decedent's death. Thus it is argued that if 
the remainder interests are to be valued as of t.hat date, the 
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remainders must be its value as determined by the life tenant's 
life expectancy at that date raUler than its value as determined 
by its actual duration. 
[3] This contention overlooks the fact that whether the 
life interest is valued under section 13953 or section 13955, 
it is still the value of that interest as of the date of the dece-
dent's death that is being determined. Valuation as of that 
date is prescribed not only by the general provisions of section 
339518 relating to property included in any transfer, but by 
the provisions of section 139524 relating specifically to an 
estate or interest for a term of years or for life. Thus, the 
value of a life interest determined under either section 13953 
or 13955 is the value of that interest as of the date of the 
decedent's death. [4] Section 13955 makes this clear by the 
specific provision that "the value of an annuity or estate 
is the present value, at the date of the transferor's death, 
of the amount of the annuity actually paid or payable to the 
annuitant or life tenant during the period he wfis entitled to 
the annuity or was in possession of the estate." (Italics 
added.) Such vah1{' is found by discounting back to the date 
of the decedent's death the payments paid or payable to the 
annuitant or life tenant while he lived. 
[5] If it were known at the date of the decedent's death 
exactly when the annuitant or life tenant would die, it would 
be known how many years he would receive the annuity or 
income specified. The annuity or estate for his life would be 
equivalent to an annuity or estate for a term for years, the 
value of which could be readily determined. Since no one 
can know how long an annuitant or life tenant will live, it is 
necessary to determine the probable duration of his life and 
to translate the annuity or estate for life into an annuity or 
estate for a term of years. That translation is generally 
made according to the combined experience tables of mortality, 
as extended, for ascertaining the value of life insurance pol-
icies and annuities. When the annuitant or life tenant dies, 
'''For the purpose of this part, the value of property included in 
any transfer subject to this part, whether or not the transfer was 
made during the lifetime of the transferor, is the market value of 
the property as of the date of the transferor's death." (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, ~ 13951.) 
"'In the case of a transfer of any estate, income, or interest (a) for 
a term of years or for life, or (b) determinable upon any future or 
contingent event, or (c) constituting a remainder, reversion, or other 
expectancy, the entire property by wlJieh thE! est.ate, income, or interest 
is supported, or of which it is a part, i~ Vlth'Prj as of the date of the 
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and it is therefore known how long he lived and how much 
he received, there is no nt'ed to resort to mortality tables, 
certainty has taken the place of probabilities and an annuity 
or estate for life has become an annuity or estate for years. 
The continued use of mortality tables would nullify the re-
quirement of accuracy in valuation prescribed by section 
13955, when the fact of the annuitant's or life tenant's death 
is known before the tax upon the transfer has been determined. 
[6] There is nothing expressed in the statutes or that can 
be reasonably implied therefrom that would justify placing 
one value on a life interest in determining the tax on its 
t"ansfer and placing another value on that interest for deduc-
tion !rom the value of the entire property in determining 
what the remaindermen receive. That section 13955 was not 
intended to provide a method for evaluating the life interest 
solely for the purpose of determining the tax on its own trans-
fer is made clear by the provisions of subsection 8 of section 8 
of the Inheritance Tax Act of 1935. (Stats 1935, p. 1279.) 
Those provisions were codifit'd in section 13953 to 13955 of 
the Revenue and Taxation Code. 
Subsection 8 provided: 
"The value of every future, or contingent or limited estate, 
ineome1or interest, shall, for the purposes of this act be deter-
mined by the rule, methods and standards of mortality and 
of value that are set forth in the actuaries' combined experi-
ence tables of Dlortality ..•. When an annuity or a life 
estate is terminated by the death of the annuitant or life ten-
ant, and the tax upon such interest has not been fixed and de-
termined, the value of said interest for the purpose of taxation 
under this act shall be the amount of the annuity or income 
actually paid or payable to the annuitant or life tenant dur-
ing the period for which such annuitant or life tenant was 
entitled to the annuity or was in possession of the life estate." 
(Italics added.) 
Thus under the express language of the statute as it 
then read the valuation of the life estate on the basis of its 
actual duration was to be made, not solely for the purpose of 
taxing the transfer of that interest, but for the purpose of 
taxation generally under the act. Similarly, under the codi-
fication of subsection 8 found in section 13955 there is no 
indication that the value of the life interest as determined 
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all purposes of inheritance taxation. To hold otherwise would 
create a conflict with section 13952 of the Revenue and Taxa· 
tion Code, which requires that the entire property be valued 
as of the date of the decedent's death. [7] That objective 
may be achieved by the consistent application of section 13953 
to determine the value of both the life interest and the re-
mainder interests, if the tax is determined before the life tenant 
dies, or by the consistent application of section 13955 to de-
termine the value of the life interest and the remainder inter-
ests, if the life tenant dies before the tax has been determined. 
If the present value of the entire property is divided between 
the respective interests by the use of mortality tables, the 
entire property will be valued as of the date of the decedent's 
death. Similarly, if the present value of the entire property 
is divided between the respective interests in accord with the 
actual duration of the life interest under section 13955 the 
entire property will still be valued as of the date of the 
decedent's death. [8] On the other hand, if .Jection 13955 is 
applied only for the purpose of computing the tax on the 
transfer of the life interest and section 13953 is applied to 
determine the value of the life interest for the purpose of 
evaluating the remainder, section 13952 will be violated. In 
such case the entire property by which the respective interests 
are supported will not be valued as of the date of the dece-
dent's death, but part of the entire property will escape 
valuation altogether. II [9] Accordingly, section 13955 must 
be used for all purposes or for none. It provides an alterna-
tive method of evaluating the life interest, when the life 
tenant dies before the determination of the tax. In that 
contingency the valuation of the life interest is removed from 
the operation of section 13953, and the value of the remainder 
mlist be determined according to the general rule by subtract-
ing the present value of the life interest as determined under 
section 13955 from the present value of th~ entire property 
as of the date of the decedent's death. 
[10] Since in this case the rate with respect to Louise'. 
interest is higher than that with respect to the grandchildren'. 
OlD the present case William's interest as determined under section 
13953 had a present value of $463,161.35 based on his life expectancy 
of 13.18 years. A.s determined under section 13955 William'. interest 
had a present ~alue of only $99,726.03. If the value as determined 
under section 13953 rnther than under 13955 is used to determine the 
value of the remainder interests, approximately $363,000 of the present 
value of decedent's estate as of the date of his death would esoape 
valuation completely. 
) 
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interest, the trial court under the provisions of section 134]] 
of the Revenue and Taxation Code6 correctly fixed the tax 
011 the transfer of her interest. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion sustains the order of the probate 
court under which the value of the interest of Louise, the 
succeeding life tenant, which was originally computed in the 
first report of the inheritance tax appraiser as of the date of 
the testator's death, was recomputed in the second report 
after the death of William, the first life tenant, at its then 
assumed value so as to impose a greater tax on Louise's interest 
than that authorized by the value of her ipterest at the date 
of the death of the testator. I am of the view that there is no 
statutory authority for such procedure, and that the order 
of the probate court should be reversed. 
The result reached in the majority opinion is there justified 
on the ground that it accomplishes "reasonable symmetry" 
in the valuation of the several interests. However, the ques-
tion h~re is not whether the Legislature could have provided 
for such revaluation of Louise's interest upon the death of 
the first life tenant, but whether the Legislature has so pro-
vided. In my opinion, it has not so provided but, on the other 
hand, has provided directly to the contrary. 
It must be remembered that an inheritance tax is not a tax 
upon property as such, as implied in the majority opinion, 
but upon the privilege of succeeding to property (24 Cal.Jur. 
§ 395, p. 425 j Estate of Miller, 184 Cal. 674, 678 [195 P. 413, 
16 A.L.R. 694] j Estate of Watkinson, 191 Cal. 591, 597 [217 
P. 1073]), and that ordinarily the value of that privilege is 
to be determined as of the date of the testator's death. Thus 
the general rule with respect to the valuation as of that date 
(24 Cal.Jur. § 422, p. 463 j Estate of Hite, 159 Cal. 392, 395 
[113 P. 1072] j Riley v. Howard, 193 Cal. 522, 528 [226 P. 
393]) has been carried into the statutory provisions declaring 
the date for valuation (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 13311, 13951), 
·"In the case of a transfer made subject to a contingency or condi-
tion upon the occurrence of which the right, interest, or estate of the 
transferee may, in whole or in part, be created, defeated, extended, 
or abridged, the tax is computed as though the contingency or condi-
tion has occurred, and at the highest rate possible." (Bev. & TaL 
Code, § 13411.) 
) 
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the interests which are affected (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13952), 
and the method for determining the value of the particular 
interests here involved according to the mortality tables (Rev. 
& Tax. Code, § 13953). 
It is thus recognized in the cited sections that whenever the 
law deals with the valuation of the privilege of succeeding 
to successive life interests, it is necessarily dealing with prob-
abilities, and that a date must be fixed for determining the 
value of such successive interests based upon such probabili-
ties. With one single exception, the general provisions ,ll 
relate to valuation as of the date of the transferor's death. 
(Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 13311, 13951, 13952, supra.) That 
single exception covers any life tenant who may die before 
the tax is fixed (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13955), in which case 
the "life estate is terminated by the death" and the value 
of the interest of such deceased life tenant may be computed 
with certainty. The value of the interest of any succeeding 
life tenant, living at the date of the fixing of the..mheritance 
tax, is not thereby rendered certain, and as to such life tenant, 
it cannot be said that "certainty has taken the place of prob-
abilities." .A:ny such succeeding life tenant might die shortly 
after the order fixing the tax had become final and the tax 
had been paid; and it may well be for this reason that the 
Legislature has made no provision for the recomputation of 
value for inheritance tax purposes based upon shifting prob-
abilities which may ultimately prove to be very inaccurate in 
forecasting subsequent events. But whatever the reason may 
have been, the Legislature has not provided for any recompu-
tation of the value of Louise's interest following the death of 
William. 
The majority opinion relies strongly upon the forerunner 
of the above mentioned section 13955 (Stats 1935,p. 1279) 
and the following phrase is quoted with the indicated empha-
sis: "When an annuity or a life estate is terminated by the 
death of the annuitant or life tenant, and the tax upon such 
interest has not been fixed and determined, the value of said 
interest for the purpose of taxation under this act shall be 
the amount of the annuity or income actually paid or payable 
to the annuitant or life tenant during the period for which 
such annuitant or life tenant was entitled to the annuity or 
was in possession of the life estate." The emphasis should 
have been placed upon the words "the value of said interest," 
but with or without emphasis, it is too clear to require further 
discussion that neither its forerunner nor the present section 
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) :1955 was or is concerned with anything other than the valua-
t.ion of the interest of a life tenant who may die before the 
iDheritance tax may have been fixed. 
While the cited statutory provisions appear to be entirely 
clear upon the point here involved, it may now be assumed 
solely for the purpose of this discussion that some uncertainty 
exists concerning their application to the facts before us. 
This assumption brings into play the well settled rule that 
"Since tax proceedings are in invitum, tax laws are strictly 
construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the state. . . . 
Strict construction in such cases is reasonable, because pre-
sumptively the Legislature has given in plain terms all the 
power intended to be exercised." (24 Cal.Jur. § 11, pp. 27-28; 
see, also, Estate of Potter, 188 Cal. 55, 64-65 [204 P. 826] ; 
Estate of Steekler, 195 Cal. 386, 389 1233 P. 972].) I am of 
the view that this salutary rule should be followed rather than 
repudiated, and that the majority opinion constitut('s a wide 
departure therefrom. 
I would therefore reverse the order of the probate court, 
with directions to tax the interest of Louise Allen Knapp 
according to its value as of the date of the death of the 
testator as determined in the first report of the inheritance 
tax appr,aiser. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
19, 1951. Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for a 
rehearing. 
.. ~ ;!.' ~. 
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